Tulpa.info - tulpa-questions-2

So in sequence or not in sequence?

Zen

Real parallel processing seems to exist in a tiny percentage of the population, tenuously, but I don't think it's described as to the level we're talking about.

Are you talking about the ability to perform multiple tasks at the same tome rather than experiencing two consciousnesses at the same time?

I'm talking about the possibility of two seperate and inaccessible-to-the-other experience.

So what small percentage of people are you talking about?

Neither of those things. I equate consciousness with the front/the brain action at the time. And multiple tasks is not what I'm getting at in any way.

That can do it?

Those were the Pee Pee people

4:21 PM

the ones who can do multiple forms of math simultaneously and stuff might be able to do it, but it's a tenuous ability and it has upper limits

Zen

Real parallel processing seems to exist in a tiny percentage of the population, tenuously, but I don't think it's described as to the level we're talking about.

You say it seems to exist, based on what?

I am not really talking about that.

4:22 PM

? I've shared those sauces before have I not?

Because i thought you were talking about multitaskers

4:22 PM

That someone shared paper about (edited)

Super multitaskers yes, but again that's not at all what I'm talking about.

4:22 PM

In any way

So I must have missed the sauce, can you repost it?

4:23 PM

Imagine how cool it would be on the podcast

From months ago? Hell no.

Sauces being read real time!

4:23 PM

Anyway I’m going to make some dinner now

Anyway I think I've lost you so... uhm... Let me give an example if I can. What I mean is, let's say me and Rhys are doing whatever. I look over, visualize Rhys, I am only experiencing a visualization of Rhys, but he is rendering a body. I am merely suggesting that they are quite possibly experiencing a perspective rendered from their form, with senses and the like, that we are not aware of consciously. In a sense, whenever that happens, even though he is not formally in the "front", he effectively is the acting front of the brain but his emotions and sensations are heavily dissociated from whoever is in the front by default like any other identity. That doesn't mean those things aren't being rendered though in real time, without confabulation. And that in whatever cognitive part of the brain he's processing in he's not experiencing things genuinely more sharply - but as this data passes to me it is muted by the thalamus because it is labelled as "other" to my identity. (edited)

4:31 PM

All it takes to get to the sharp experience is dissociation from senses, which is possible quite rapidly if your brain is good at it.

4:32 PM

And by default a tulpa is much more likely to be in that state unless they're among the "the form is a puppet and you're actually linked with my senses always" crowd. In which case obviously, they would probably be more present but less likely to get strong experience from visualization/daydreaming whatever you wanna call it. (edited)

I am quite lost here, @Zen. In your opinion tulpa can be immersed in WL etc. and have their own, significantly perspective on it while we focus on them, even if we don't experience their perspective?

Yes, that's what I'm specifically saying, as it's more than possible for the brain to do that via how it handles association and dissociation; as one action. That's already how empathy models seem to work. They're generated at full strength but we are made not fully aware of them due to the brain muting their emotions in the same way it mutes your own senses when a particular sense is irrelevant (but in this case it's due to maintaining distance from potentially unwelcome emotion and reasoning and generally maintaining cohesion of a primary perspective.). It's not a matter of parallel processing so much as it is us not seeing a full image of what the brain is actually sensing - Only one of us will be feeling a distinct state at any given time, but since perspective is generated from intercommunication from different brain parts it seems eminently possible we naturally generate two from that one discreet image or state. (edited)

9:13 PM

It relies on focus though, if you aren't in some way giving processing power over to the visualization and empathy parts of the brain, that perspective isn't happening by default. It requires the brain to actively divert attention away from yours in order to even do. You have to stop and render a wonderland for them to experience, or render them in your visual space, which is innately taking your attention from anything else you're doing. @Deleted User (edited)

Most importantly it's important to recognize that the muting process here doesn't mean that in the part of the brain they being rendered the full image is not still happening. The muting happens purely as a result of communication in the brain between sections so it's entirely possible it's an illusion. Psychosis may be what happens when none of the muting process is working at all, causing all voices and perspectives to be felt at their full and true strength, and revealing the illusion of being weaker than us these perspectives really is. (edited)

I'm not sure if I'm following either. Confabulation is usually about a tulpa doing something they think they did in the past but most likely didn't do, not immersion ability. For instance, a tulpa that goes on an epic quest when the host is doing their homework. Given the general understanding of tulpas, probably not. A tulpa and host wonderlanding together isn't really confabulation assuming the focus is being used to create the wonderland and experience it. While you can question if any given thing was actually the tulpa, host, or neither, I believe that's something else and isn't related to confabulation. I would consider it parroting if the tulpa is influenced by their host. For example, let's say Gray summons me in wonderland and finds I appear exhausted- I have bags under my eyes, I don't move quickly, and I struggle to focus on him. It's very possible Gray is projecting his expectation of me and what is rendered is his expectation. However, I personally believe it isn't. I have surprised Gray before by communicating with how my form appears. Interestingly, looking at your own form in our system can give you some self-awareness about how you feel, regardless of who else is around. (edited)

Bear in mind that changing your appearance can change how you feel.

Zen

Yes, that's what I'm specifically saying, as it's more than possible for the brain to do that via how it handles association and dissociation; as one action. That's already how empathy models seem to work. They're generated at full strength but we are made not fully aware of them due to the brain muting their emotions in the same way it mutes your own senses when a particular sense is irrelevant (but in this case it's due to maintaining distance from potentially unwelcome emotion and reasoning and generally maintaining cohesion of a primary perspective.). It's not a matter of parallel processing so much as it is us not seeing a full image of what the brain is actually sensing - Only one of us will be feeling a distinct state at any given time, but since perspective is generated from intercommunication from different brain parts it seems eminently possible we naturally generate two from that one discreet image or state. (edited)

Is normal for the brain to retain memory of given muted senses? I had thought that it wasn't for some reason.

Scarlet

Is normal for the brain to retain memory of given muted senses? I had thought that it wasn't for some reason.

Perhaps it could, since it's possible to remember what you thought someone was feeling. That would be a use of an empathy model.

Yes but normally you are consciously of thinking that at the time.

10:34 PM

I'd also be curious how the brain behavior differs between cognitive and affective empathy.

Cerys

Bear in mind that changing your appearance can change how you feel.

I gave it a try. Trying to express a different emotion does change how I feel, but it feels wrong when my form doesn't match how I feel. I have this sense I don't like it.

Memory is generally fucky. I do think there's not enough information regarding how memory interacts with plurality but if I had to guess I don't think being in the front is arbitrary to memory - I think whoever is fronting is possibly the one recording memory entirely. And if the rest is stored at all it's stored in a dissociated state.

A long kiss goodnight

I gave it a try. Trying to express a different emotion does change how I feel, but it feels wrong when my form doesn't match how I feel. I have this sense I don't like it.

(It can take a little while for me, but if the image isn't far off from how I already feel, I can change how I feel just by changing my profile picture.)

Scarlet

Yes but normally you are consciously of thinking that at the time.

Yes, you could remember the scene, and feel how you felt that model of them was feeling. I think I see what you mean, though. Perhaps the memory from the point of view of the model isn't retained.

I'm not sure how to render the concept any better for that matter. The best I think I can put is that I think two streams of perspective are possible by splitting a whole, and I think this is the default for singlets as well using empathy. But this not the same thing as splitting the conscious space of the brain or parallel processing.

10:40 PM

But it does mean the possibility of two distinct experiences that I may not have any real record of. (edited)

Memory is generally fucky. I do think there's not enough information regarding how memory interacts with plurality but if I had to guess I don't think being in the front is arbitrary to memory - I think whoever is fronting is possibly the one recording memory entirely. And if the rest is stored at all it's stored in a dissociated state.

@Zen - jump I think the front makes memories more confusing. It's hard to tell Ranger and I apart when we do stuff we did while switched-in unless we remember the context. It might be easier to remember things we did in the back sometimes. My headmates seem to talk about stuff that's important to them we completely forget about. However, I suspect memory formation comes from what it's associated with, so if you don't associate yourself with a memory, you will probably not remember it as easily or if not forget it was you who did it.

Cerys

(It can take a little while for me, but if the image isn't far off from how I already feel, I can change how I feel just by changing my profile picture.)

I agree it takes a little bit before it sinks in. It definitely doesn't work immediately.

If you can't make a wonderland somehow act like a SOC, the other thing I would be curious about trying is getting us to split while we're both switched-in at the same time. Instead of leaving the front, we try to separate and create two streams instead of one.

10:45 PM

I'm not excited about trying that right now, because if it worked, well... I don't really want to be stuck where we can parallel process and only parallel process

To be blunt I don't think that's possible. When I say two seperate experiences I mean it's possible for the brain to do something like this: [Rhys is the focus, and taking the lion's share of brain juice] [Rhys is being rendered with a body and senses and such things in wonderland/overlaid on reality] [I am barely functioning at this time and just watching and receiving heavily dissociated feedback from their actions] [Practically the brain is experiencing more sense from their perspective than mine, though from my perspective their emotions and sensations are inherently muted] I don't mean that it's possible for us to do really any action at the same time. I have never experienced an instance that I would describe as parallel processing in that sense and I think if it exists at all it is a rare quirk of neurodivergence. (edited)

Zen, in this case you just presented, you would be fronting, right?

Yes.

1

I think I understand what you're saying, and I think you could be right.

Or perhaps barely. I think stopping to visualize is sort of innately dissociative. I'm not entirely sure how much the front is an illusion or a solid thing.

10:54 PM

I think it's interesting that people with psychosis don't innately lose control of the front. There remains a primary perspective in the brain at any given time.

1

By 'fronting' I mean that the scene that is being played out is that you are watching Rhys, not the other way around.

Even when all perspectives are at proverbial full strength

Also I do not dissociate from the front when I "switch"; at all. And I don't think I want to learn. My experiences with dissociation have been entirely through hypnosis where the goal is for both of us to be present in visualization and keying in to high-strength hallucinatory sensations. With all of this it's next to impossible to test any of this without some sort external brain scanning shenanigans I think. Let's say I switch dissociatively and experience something cool and stronger. I have no idea whether that's just because I suggested to myself that would happen or whether that's the default. I am also already quite good at causing rapid suggested sensation so I really can't trust it as a source of data.

I don't think that is dissociating from the front that you're thinking about, but rather the front dissociating from the senses.

11:06 PM

I don't think there is really anything to fear in not being present in front. But maybe I'm wrong and that is really what you're talking about. But it's come to be my opinion that people don't know exactly what the experience of one vs the other is like, and either conflate or confuse the two

11:07 PM

Well, nothing to fear so long as you trust your headmate, anyway.

I mean that when Rhys is the primary origin of thought I do not dissociate from sense in any way, I continue to experience as Rhys. I would expect that the only way to achieve the inverse perspective would be to dissociate and be rendered intentionally by Rhys while he's minimally active. But I fail to see the reason to do so other than for science.

Also I do not dissociate from the front when I "switch"

I remember you mentioning this before. So you never do a full switch, you just bring in some friends?

With all of this it's next to impossible to test any of this without some sort external brain scanning shenanigans I think.

I'm not sure this would even help if all the external brain scan could do was tell you some activity was happening. I wouldn't be surprised if some heavy activity was happening. My reason is, whenever I'm in a situation where I'm modelling the internal state of a lot of people all at once, I get very exhausted after a while. I can't recall ever remembering anything from the point of view of those models, but I think a lot of processing might be going on, even if most of that perspective isn't logged.

Well the reason we know some of the stuff about dissociative behaviour being linked to internal brain communication is because of scans of people with DID.

11:14 PM

The problem is though we have broad understandings of the areas of the brain how the hell would we distinguish communication between two identity structures in the brain, given that those things are just collections of behaviour without the dissociative effect? We would need to not only see information be passed through the thalamus and be muted but understand where it's going in detail, in a way that we just don't know at the moment.

11:16 PM

We may not have the capacity to seriously read a brain until we literally build a bigger one to do it with neural networks lol.

I have a feeling that once we do we will find out it behaves nothing like most plural folk assume that it does.

11:20 PM

Unfortunately we probably won't see that day in my lifetime unless my other wishes come true.

It seems likely to me that no two brains are alike, so reading one may be practically impossible. With brain scanning, would you be looking for physical evidence of dissociation, as seen in scans of people with DID? If so, may I submit the idea that dissociation would still be dissociation regardless of how it is physically implemented by the brain. In much the same way that you can remake an old game in a new engine and make it look identical to the end user, even though the physical implementation is different.

I wonder too what we could even look for. I feel like I am lacking knowledge to discuss this topic in detail, without being biased by my own experience.

Vermetten, et al. used MRI to compare the brain structure of female patients with DID to healthy subjects and found that the hippocampus and amygdala of the DID patients were significantly smaller (19.2% and 31.6%, respectively) (630). Such a significant difference in brain structure would imply that the hippocampus and amygdala are key in understanding DID, which seems to make good sense given the hippocampus’s role in forming long-term memories and the amygdala’s in regulating emotion. Irregularities in these brain areas would, thus, help account for the variance of memory and emotions among the different alters present in DID.

11:23 PM

Going to sleep now

Night night! ❤️

While there may not be such a clearly identifiable structural difference in DID patients, functional imaging studies (those that measure the amount of brain activity) have produced some valuable results. Two studies of interest measured regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) as a way of inferring relative activity in different areas of the brain. One study compared rCBF of DID patients while they were in their host personality with normal controls and observed lower rCBF in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) of the DID subjects (Sar, et al. 219–20). The orbitofrontal cortex is thought to be involved in decision-making. Thus, Sar hypothesizes that the decreased functioning of the OFC results in impulsivity and that the switch to an alter personality may represent a drastic expression of impulsive behavior caused by cognitive and emotional conflicts (222). The second study, conducted by Reinders, et al., measured rCBF of DID subjects in a neutral personality state (NPS) compared with a traumatic personality state (TPS) while they listened to a memory script. The procedure is described: “Subjects listened to two autobiographical audiotaped memory scripts involving a neutral and a trauma-related experience. The neutral memory script was regarded as a personal experience by both personality states. However, only the TPS experienced the trauma-related script as personally relevant” (2120). The study discovered no difference between the NPS and TPS when listening to the neutral script, as well as no difference between the neutral and traumatic scripts for the NPS. Comparing the NPS and TPS rCBF when listening to the traumatic script, though, the study found a deactivation pattern of brain areas in the NPS. This pattern matches the deactivation pattern found in studies of normal subjects when recalling non-autobiographical memories as opposed to autobiographical memories. Thus, one conclusion of the study is that, on a neurobiological level, the alters

11:26 PM

the alters in DID do in fact have different autobiographical selves. Furthermore, among the brain areas that were deactivated in the NPS versus the TPS is the medial prefrontal cortex (2122–3). This is a significant finding, as the prefrontal cortex is involved in personality expression and also contains the orbitofrontal cortex. These two studies both implicate the orbitofrontal cortex as a key to understanding DID.

11:26 PM

Some useful info for your onversation here maybe (edited)

Take care of your back, proxi.

But yeah trying to get TPS out is the hardest part of therapy

11:27 PM

Ok going now

2

I do think it hinges around that, separate models, separate blocks of memories that are "mine". I think a lot of the other stuff, particularly around switching, will turn out to be a lot more mundane and compromised out of relatively common functions just applied or combined in a different way.

I agree with that assertion.

11:35 PM

And, yes, it's practically impossible for us to decode a complete brain since it's a self-forming structure. We know some of the rules of its forming but not how to decode them in detail, and it might take full simulation to decode a brain.

11:35 PM

Which would again, mean a massive supercomputer capable of rendering one inside of it. Hehe... it would be truly plural.

While stuff proxi mentioned are interesting, they don't answer our doubts about if tulpa actually can experience stuff in different perspective which is not directly experienced by us too.

When it comes to scans it's also important to remember they are not uniform, they're idiosyncratic. There's subtle differences between each and every scan, and we can't tell what's relevant and what's just a slightly different environment. It's broad strokes we understand at the moment and if identities are rendered in the same area of the brain, how can we really tell what line of thought is two identites and which are not?

Back to discussing philosophy rather than science and possibilities rather than concretes I guess.

11:38 PM

I think that Zen claim about tulpa's perspective might be unfalsifiable with our current knowledge.

nods I brought all of this up because I feel there is perhaps an over-attachment to cynicism taking the place of skepticism. It's important to remember that things don't always follow "common sense". Sometimes things actually are weird.

Zen

When it comes to scans it's also important to remember they are not uniform, they're idiosyncratic. There's subtle differences between each and every scan, and we can't tell what's relevant and what's just a slightly different environment. It's broad strokes we understand at the moment and if identities are rendered in the same area of the brain, how can we really tell what line of thought is two identites and which are not?

Well and I think one thing that gets lost in those when people make a huge deal out of scan differences between host and other parts/headmates, is I would be curious to how much singlets vary in similar measures across all different possible states that they can experience. (edited)

Zen

nods I brought all of this up because I feel there is perhaps an over-attachment to cynicism taking the place of skepticism. It's important to remember that things don't always follow "common sense". Sometimes things actually are weird.

That's fair

Oh I definitely agree things often are weird.

What I mean is that I can't prove your claims are not true. But I think the burden of proof would be yours here. Like, while I can't disprove it I think it might be unnecessarily complex when compared to alternatives.

Yes, that is my stance also Mon.

11:43 PM

Something something principle of parsimony aka "Occam's razor".

Yeah, I had occam razor in mind here.

Complex? I'm curious why you think it's more complex?

11:45 PM

Also if we do not render other states then mute them then the alternative is... what? I'm not clear on your position completely.

The complexity here comes from experiencing stuff from 2 different perspectives and being disconnected from the other one. And with that, the other one being a black box.

I personally think that Zen's idea is intuitive, because some sort of processing of other states seems to be being done.

But we observe that possibility?

11:48 PM

Also it's never a complete black box

11:48 PM

Otherwise it would have no function

Zen

Otherwise it would have no function

How so?

11:49 PM

It would have outputs, no?

Deleted User

While stuff proxi mentioned are interesting, they don't answer our doubts about if tulpa actually can experience stuff in different perspective which is not directly experienced by us too.

Catching up on the conversation, but this is a question we can't even answer for other human beings so it's super unlikely it will be answered for tulpas. My personal conclusion has been to cut a compromise, or to realize that I was merging two concepts that didn't need to be merged - agency and having an experience are different things and you can "be your own person" or "have your own agency and decision making capability" without "having your own experience" (edited)